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THE NEED FOR LOGIC AND CONSISTENCY
IN FETAL RIGHTS
For some people, any mention of fetal rights raises fears of Big
Brother invading privacy, ending advances in women's rights, and
forcing medical care on unconsenting adults. Others see the rec-
ognition of fetal rights as an advancement of their personal views
on abortion.
Abortion and women's rights. The manner in which Ameri-
cans deal with both of these issues has a definite impact on society,
but the focus on these issues has ignored the importance of
advances in fetal rights. Consequently, fetal rights are in a state of
confusion. Advances in medicine and science and the consequent
implications at the moral and societal level have combined to cre-
ate a body of law which defies both logic and precedent.1 The
problem is further complicated by the fact that fetal rights issues
enter into almost every area of the law, touching tort recovery for
injuries, occupational qualifications, discrimination, criminal laws,
property inheritance, and child abuse and neglect.2 Each of these
legal disciplines has its own precedents and purposes.3 There is no
reason to expect each state to deal with fetal rights in exactly the
same fashion, but many states suffer common internal inconsisten-
cies. These problems could be solved if the state legislatures
would view the problem holistically and begin to draft and redraft
laws that are workable, fair, and consistent.
This Note will first discuss the history of fetal rights and then
analyze some inconsistencies in the current state of the law. It will
not focus on specific remedies. Readers may want to consider, as
possible solutions, the effectiveness of (1) a federal law which
would focus on the rights of the fetus and control the actions of the
1. Charles H. Baron, If You Prick Us, Do We Not Bleed?: Of Shylock, Fetuses, and the
Concept of Person in the Law, 11 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 52 (1982). Inconsistencies in
the legal treatment of the unborn reflect social values and policies considered by
lawmakers. Id. at 55.
2. See Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (tort case questioning
whether there is a cause of action for wrongful death of a fetus); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (Supreme Court holding that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment); International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991) (majority and concurrence conflicting over how significant the rights of fetuses are in
an occupational discrimination case); Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 200 A. 467 (R.I. 1938)
(property case questioning whether fetus should receive income from a trust from date of
decedent's death or child's birth); In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Fam. Ct.
1990) (court questioning whether state has the power to protect fetus from abuse or neglect
by parents).
3. Baron, supra note 1, at 55. A fetus is considered a person for some purposes, but not
all. Id. The granting of personhood status varies from one area of the law to another. Id.
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states; or (2) a Model Fetal Rights Act which would provide a holis-
tic example for the individual state legislatures.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Historically, legal rights focused on the mother, and the fetus
was treated as part of her.4 The unborn were generally not
afforded separate rights.5 There were exceptions to this rule how-
ever, usually created in attempts to protect the health and welfare
of the future children.6
In 1798, an English probate court decided a case involving the
debate over whether children conceived, but not born, at a testa-
tor's death should be able to inherit from a decedent's will.7 One
of the judges explained that the unborn should be able to inherit
from the will because they were more than mere nonentities:
Let us see what this non-entity can do. He may be
vouched in a recovery .... He may be an executor. He
may take under the Statute of Distributions .... He may
take by devise. He may be entitled under a charge for
raising portions.rs] He may have an injunction; and he
may have a guardian.9
Throughout history, fetuses have frequently been granted
specific rights that have evolved with time. The unborn, however,
"have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense."' The remainder of this section will outline the develop-
ment of fetal rights up to the present time in the areas of tort law,
4. Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 601
(1986). This was true because historically a fetus was not considered an independent entity
that could enjoy rights hostile to the mother's rights. Id. at 599. Today, courts have
determined that pregnant women and their fetuses often have adverse interests. Id. at 600.
5. Id. at 599.
6. Id. See also William J. Curran, A Historical Perspective on the Law of Personality
and Status with Special Regard to the Human Fetus and the Rights of Women, 61 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q, 58, 59 (1983). Early Romans adopted a system of fictitious birth so that
the unborn could hold rights such as inheriting from a father who had died prior to the
child's actual birth. Id.
7. Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798). A widow and her children
sued to have her husband's will declared void as against the decedent's twin grandsons, who
were born shortly after his death. Id. at 122. The court determined that several different
lives could be used to determine when contingent future interests must be certain to vest
or fail, thus allowing the grandchildren to recover. Id. at 142.
8. Black's Law Dictionary explains that "raising portions" refers to the fact that after a
death, an oldest son often inherited the family land. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1133 (5th
ed. 1985). This son had to give specific sums of money to younger siblings. Id.
9. Thellusson, 31 Eng. Rep. at 163.
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). The Court made this statement in an
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In 1884, Dietrich v. Northampton1 1 held that there could be
no recovery for prenatal injuries. 12 In this case, a woman tripped
on a defect on the defendant's highway when she was four to five
months pregnant.' 3  The court determined that the accident
caused a miscarriage, therefore preventing the unborn child from
maintaining an action against the tortfeasor.14 The court reasoned
that no duty was owed to a person who did not exist.' In 1960,
Smith v. Brennan 6 discussed the most common reasons histori-
cally given for denying recovery to children injured prior to birth:
(1) the unborn was considered part of the mother and was owed no
independent duty; (2) stare decisis; (3) lack of precedent; (4) diffi-
culty in proving causation; and (5) fear of fraud. 7
In the middle of the twentieth century, American courts
began to recognize causes of action for prenatal injuries as long as
the injury was post-viability,' the baby was later born alive,'" and
the defendant was a third party.20 The live-birth requirement
allowed courts that were unwilling to grant rights to fetuses to
attempt to justify its balance of states' interests in fetal rights and women's rights in
abortion/privacy. Id. at 156-62.
11. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
12. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).
13. Id. at 14-15.
14. Id. at 15.
15. Id. at 16. It is interesting that some witnesses stated that the infant did live for ten
to fifteen minutes after birth, but the court still determined that the child did not survive
the premature birth. Id. at 15. See also infra note 132 (discussing this all-or-nothing
problem).
16. 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
17. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 500 (N.J. 1960). In Smith, an infant was born
injured due to a car accident 75 days prior to birth. Id. at 504. The court allowed the boy to
recover from the tortfeasor in spite of all of the reasons given for denying recovery. Id. at
500-05. The court felt that all of the reasons for denying recovery to children who were
injured as fetuses were inadequate: "They deny basic medical knowledge; they ignore the
protection afforded unborn children by other branches of the law, and are founded upon
fears which should not weigh with the courts." Id. at 504.
18. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979) (viability being the point when there
is "reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without
artificial support"); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Bonbrest was the first
case recognizing a cause of action by a child for injuries received in utero-so long as the
injury was post-viability. Id. at 142-43.
19. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140. The court reasoned that a child had demonstrated its
ability to survive by subsequently being born alive. Id.
20. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 122, at 904-05 (5th
ed. 1984). The defendant had to be a third party because American courts prohibited tort
actions by minor children against their parents. Id.
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consider the locus of the rights to be in a live-born child.2'
Tortfeasors compensated living children for burdens inflicted on
them as fetuses. 22 Courts reasoned that these children deserved
tort recovery due to the fundamental theories that there is a rem-
edy for every wrong and that the tortfeasors should compensate
the children for injuries they proximately caused.23
Today, all courts allow causes of action by a child who was
prenatally injured past viability and later born alive.2 4 "All writers
who have discussed the problem have joined in condemning the
total no-duty rule and agree that the unborn child in the path of an
automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother and
should be equally protected under the law."'25 Some states have
expanded their laws to allow recovery by fetuses who were injured
prior to viability, 26 even prior to conception.27
21. Rosa H. Kim, Reconciling Fetal/Maternal Conflicts, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 223, 226
(1990). If the locus of rights was in the child, this enabled the courts to avoid any potential
conflicts with the rights of the mother while she was pregnant. Id.
22. Karen G. Crockett & Miriam Hyman, Note, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to
Recognition of Rights, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 825 (1976). Recovery is given for prenatal
injuries to compensate the postnatal child for its inflictions. Id. One commentator has
explained the intent of tort compensation:
The fact that courts permit live born infants to recover damages for prenatal
injuries does not mean that courts view the unborn as 'persons.' Instead, the
courts are interested in protecting the interests of the damaged live born person.
The courts are not compensating fetuses, but are instead compensating children
who need special medical treatment, schooling, or other services because of the
acts of some tortfeasor.
LEONARD H. GLANTZ, Is the Fetus a Person? A Lawyer's View, in ABORTION AND THE
STATUS OF THE FETUS 114 (William B. Bondeson et al. eds., 1983).
23. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (clarifying the
general tort rule that the injured deserve to recover for all harm caused-whether
anticipated or not); Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489 (Ct. App. 1980)
(there should be a remedy for every wrong). But see Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 459
N.Y.S.2d 814, 818 (App. Div. 1983) (no requirement in the law to provide relief for every
injury suffered).
24. KEETON, supra note 20, § 55, at 368. See also Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 459
N.Y.S.2d 814, 815-16 (App. Div. 1983) (explaining that since both can be injured, the duty of
informed consent runs to both a mother and her unborn child); Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit, 87 N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ohio 1949). A woman was pregnant when she fell off a bus and
injured her viable child. Id. at 334. The court allowed the child to recover, because any
other ruling apparently would have caused a deprivation of the child's constitutional rights.
Id. at 340. " 'So far as duty is concerned, if existence at the time is necessary, medical
authority has recognized long since that the child is in existence from the moment of
conception, and for many purposes its existence is recognized by the law."' Id. at 339
(quoting PROSSER ON TORTS, § 188).
25. KEETON, supra note 20, § 55, at 368.
26. Id. at 368-69; Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 219-23 (Mich. 1971) (four-
month fetus allowed to sue and recover for injuries sustained in a car accident); Hornbuckle
v. Plantation Pipe Line, Co., 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (Ga. 1956) (child should be allowed to
recover for injuries sustained at any point following conception).
27. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1258-59 (Ill. 1977) (foreseeable that
a teenaged girl would eventually have children, so girl's child can recover for injuries
caused by a negligent blood transfusion to her mother prior to conception); Bergstreser v.
Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 26 (8th Cir. 1978) (infant had a cause of action for his brain damage
due to a negligent caesarean section performed on his mother two years prior to his birth).
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2. Wrongful Death/Wrongful Life
Traditionally, a woman who suffered a miscarriage was
allowed to recover for her own injuries, but she could not recover
for the loss of her child, because the child had not been born
alive.2 8 Today, a majority of states have abandoned this "born-
alive" rule 29 and allow wrongful death actions based on miscar-
riages and stillbirths. 30 Courts reason that holding a tortfeasor lia-
ble for injuries only if the fetus is later born alive will reinstate the
illogical common law rule of making tortfeasors liable for injuries
but immune for deaths.31 Some states, however, limit these suits
by allowing claims only if the fetus was viable at the time of the
death.32
There have also been recent attempts by children who were
born alive to sue for "wrongful life."' 33 One court has suggested
that genetically defective children could sue their parents for fail-
ing to abort.3 a
But see Albala v. City of New York, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (1981) (no cause of action for
injuries suffered as a result of negligent prior abortion against mother).
28. KEETON, supra note 20, § 55, at 369. Courts and legislatures feared double
recovery as well as problems with proof of causation and damages. Id.
29. Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
"Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 735-37 (1986).
See a list of the states in the majority at note 150 and of states in the minority at note 151 (as
of 1986). Id. at 737. See also Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984)
(conditioning recovery on live birth is unjust and creates unreasonable and artificial
demarcations); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1973). Chrisafogeorgis
was an action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child and for the personal injuries of the
mother, who was struck by a car during her ninth month of pregnancy. Id. at 88-89. The
court allowed recovery for both, unable to reconcile the discrepancy allowing causes of
action for postnatal deaths but not for prenatal deaths. Id. at 91.
30. See, e.g., Bolk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982). The court recognized a right to
sue for the wrongful death of a viable stillborn child. Id. at 15. See also Toth v. Goree, 237
N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). In wrongful death actions, the deceased's representative
must stand in the shoes of the deceased. Id. at 299. When suing for the wrongful death of a
fetus, it is the fetus' rights that are being alleged, not the rights of the mother. Id.
31. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88 (11. 1973). With this
requirement, tortfeasors would be rewarded for killing, rather than just maiming, a fetus,
and therefore tortfeasors would be discouraged from attempting to save the lives of their
victims. Id. at 92.
32. See Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529, 529 (D.D.C. 1971) ("The
increasing weight of authority supports the proposition that a viable unborn child, which
would have been born alive but for the negligence of defendant, is a 'person' within the
meaning of the wrongful death statutes."); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1980). The Salazar court determined that the legislature must have only
intended recovery for viable fetuses, since only viable fetuses were protected by the
criminal statute when the wrongful death statute was enacted. Id. at 826-30. Criminal law
was relevant because civil liability evolved from criminal law. Id. at 830.
33. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980). A child with
Tay-Sachs disease sued medical testing laboratories and her doctor for wrongful life. Id. at
480. She claimed that due to negligence, a testing laboratory gave her parents incorrect
information concerning their status as carriers of the disease. Id. at 479-80. The parents
relied on the results of the testing either in conceiving or in failing to abort. Id. at 480. The
court held that the child could recover damages if proved. Id. at 488-89.
34. Id. at 488. See also Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus,
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:171
3. Informed Consent
Informed consent is a term which signifies that a person has
agreed to something after receiving a full disclosure of relevant
facts.35 For example, a surgeon must disclose any serious risks
prior to surgery so that a patient can weigh the benefits and dan-
gers and make an intelligent decision as to whether or not to sub-
mit to surgery.36
In one New York case, an infant claimed medical malpractice
against her mother's physician due to tortuously inflicted prenatal
injuries.37 The court explained that the doctor had a duty to
receive informed consent from the patient prior to medical treat-
ment,38 and, in this case, both the mother and the fetus were
patients.3 9 Obviously the fetus could not consent, but the parent
could consent on the child's/fetus' behalf as he or she could for any
other child who is unable to give legal consent. 40  Here, the
mother was time-barred from claiming battery due to lack of
informed consent, but the infant was not.4 1  Fetuses often have
this extended statute of limitations due to the fact that minors may
have until a certain age to file suit.42
4. Forced Surgery
Traditionally, the law has opposed compelled bodily intrusions
on nonconsenting adults,43 but this right has been subject to
5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984). "Severely defective newborns have been allowed to die," as
have elderly with terminal illnesses. Id. at 97. Deformed fetuses can only be allowed to die
by removing them from the mother. Id. If deformed fetuses have a right to die, then
parents and doctors have duties to fulfill this right. Id. But see Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge
in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951,
1961 (1986) ("federal 'Baby Doe' legislation has significantly reduced parental authority to
reject aggressive medical treatment even for those children who will inevitably be
disabled.").
35. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Ctr., 499 P.2d 1, 8 (Wash. 1972) (request for an
"informed consent" instruction in a suit for paralyzation due to radiation therapy).
36. Id.
37. Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 1983). The nature of the
injury was not revealed, but it arose due to the doctor's failure to obtain adequate informed
consent. Id. at 815.
38. Id. at 816.
39. Id. at 817. See also Katherine A. Knopoff, Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse
Fetal Surgery? 79 CAL. L. REV. 499 (1991). Two potential patients present themselves
when a pregnant woman visits her doctor. Id. at 502.
40. Hughson, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
41. Id. at 816, 818. The court denied that a child's claim was simply derivative of the
mother's action, thus the child had a cause of action. Id. at 818. If the child's action was
derivative of the mother's, then the infant would not be able to sue for injuries if the
mother decided not to sue or found herself time-barred. Id. The court also clarified that
though the infant's claim could be called something other than informed consent, it arose
from a failure to disclose the risks that a fetus alone may encounter by the treatment. Id.
42. Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978).
43. Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1583-88 (1979)
176
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exceptions. Surgeries have been permitted to remove evidence of
crimes.4 4 Vaccinations have been forced.45 Incompetents have
had organs removed for family members.4 6 Pregnant women
have been frequent exceptions to this general rule opposing com-
pelled bodily intrusions.47 Although some cases have held that a
pregnant woman can decide the fate of her child,48 many have
determined that the state's interest in the life of the fetus out-
weighs the intrusion into the lives of the parents.49 Courts often
(punishment, pain, and bodily intrusions seldom allowed); McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. &
C.3d 90, 90-92 (1978) (man's first cousin not forced to undergo further testing for
compatibility of tissue or to donate bone marrow for transplantation if sufficient
compatibility were present); In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (man
identified in adoption records as the father of a man with leukemia not compelled to
undergo a blood test to help the sick man identify compatible donors); Boy at Center of Suit
for a Marrow Donor is Dead of Leukemia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990, at B9. In the Times
article, the mother of a boy refused to consent to having son tested for compatibility for
bone marrow donation to his half-brother. Id. The court stated that forcing the test would
violate the boy's constitutional right to privacy. Id.
44. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (forced surgical
removal of a bullet from defendant's arm allowed in order to use the bullet as evidence),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966)
(sample of blood removed by force for use as evidence). See also Regan, supra note 43, at
1585 (cases dealing with surgical searches, such as bullets, draw a line between superficial
incisions (which are permissible) and further intrusions into the body (which are not)).
Compare United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) with Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753 (1985) (forced surgical removal of bullet would violate suspect's constitutional
rights) and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced pumping of criminal suspect's
stomach violated his right of due process and shocks the conscience).
45. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Small pox vaccinations were
compulsory upon a showing of a real or substantial relationship between state action and
general welfare. Id. at 30-39.
46. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). The court granted a
mother's petition to remove a kidney from her incompetent son to be transplanted into her
dying son. Id.
47. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1192-93 (1987). A five-year survey of attempts to override maternal
refusals of medical treatment revealed twenty-one such endeavors. Id. Fifteen court
orders were sought and thirteen overrides were granted. Id. E.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 985 (1964). In Raleigh, a hospital was given authority to administer a blood
transfusion to a pregnant woman against her wishes in order to protect her child. Id. at
537-38.
48. E.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990). The court determined that unless
a pregnant woman is incapable of giving informed consent, she should decide on the
medical treatment for herself and her child. Id. at 1237. The court reversed a lower court's
order compelling a woman to have a caesarean section (for the health of the fetus). Id. As
to the woman and her child, however, the reversal was moot, since the surgery had already
been performed and neither had survived. Id.
49. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). If
doctors say that a fetus is at serious risk, a woman may be forced to have a caesarean section
despite her refusal. Id. at 458. In this case, there was 99% certainty that the baby would
not survive a normal delivery, and 50% chance that the mother would not survive. Id. at
459. Doctors determined that a caesarean section would give both an almost 100% chance
of survival. Id. The court found that the state has an interest in the life of an unborn, living
human being. Id. at 460. The intrusion into the parents' lives is outweighed by a state's
duty to protect living, unborn human beings from meeting their deaths before being given
an opportunity to live. Id. Doctors Bowes and Selgestad described a similar situation from
a medical case report. Watson A. Bowes & Brad Selgestad, 58 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 209,
209-10 (1981) (citing Colorado's Children's Code, located at COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-104(3)
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distinguish between viable and nonviable fetuses in this area as
well.5 °
C. CRIMINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. Abortion
The Supreme Court has taken an historical account of abor-
tion throughout time.5 In ancient Greece and Rome, abortion
was common.52 The practice was "resorted to without scruple, 53
unless a mother aborted a fetus without the approval of the
father.5 4 If the mother procured an abortion without this consent,
the father could bring legal action against her for violating his
right to his child.5 5 The charge was homicide, but it was not based
on the fetus' right to life; rather, it was based on the father's right
to an heir.56 A father could also require that an abortion be per-
formed if he chose not to acknowledge the child.51 It is also inter-
esting to note that the Hippocratic Oath opposed abortion at the
time it was written (which was some time prior to the first century
A.D.).5 1 At that time, however, the Oath was simply an isolated
ethical code that was inconsistent with the practices of the medical
profession.5 9
(1973)). A woman with a problem pregnancy was admitted to the hospital with labor
problems. Id. Doctors proposed a caesarean section, but the woman refused. Id. A
hospital psychiatrist examined the patient and reported that she was competent to decide
whether or not to submit to surgery. Id. The hospital attorneys decided to seek a court
order mandating the caesarean section. Id. A Juvenile Court judge declared the child
dependent and neglected and thus ordered the surgery, citing the Colorado Children's
Code allowing orders of treatment when it is in the best interests of a child. Id. at 210. In
addition to forced caesarean sections, courts have also compelled blood transfusions.
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). A hospital received authority to administer a
blood transfusion to a Jehovah's Witness, contrary to her wishes, in order to protect her
unborn child. Id. at 537-38. The court determined that the unborn are entitled to the
protection of the laws. Id. at 538.
50. See, e.g., Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983). Due to religious reasons, a
pregnant woman refused an operation that would have prevented the premature birth of
her four-month-old fetus. Id. at 396. The courts reversed the lower decision and forbade
the surgery. Id. at 397. The court stated that there were not any cases that compelled
surgery on a pregnant woman to protect a pre-viable fetus. Id. at 397 n.4.
51. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-47 (1973).
52. RICHARD HARROW FEEN, Abortion and Exposure in Ancient Greece: Addressing
the Status of the Fetus and the 'Newborn'from Classical Sources, in ABORTION AND THE
STATUS OF THE FETUS at 290-91 (William B. Bondeson et al., eds., 1983).
53. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 1, 10 (A Supp. to the Bulletin of the
history of Med. 1943).
54. FEEN, supra note 52, at 291.
55. Id. at 290-91.
56. Id. at 291.
57. Id. at 290-91. Once a child was born, a father could also choose to abandon his
newborn, thereby causing a death by "exposure." Id. at 285-86.
58. Id. at 296.
59. Id. The Hippocratic Oath was intended as a religious manifesto for members of a
[Vol. 68:171
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English common law held that abortion prior to quickening6 °
was not indictable, 6 but abortion beyond that point was either a
felony or a misdemeanor. 62 Early criminal abortion statutes pre-
served this distinction by making it a capital crime to abort after
quickening but a lesser crime prior to quickening.63 By the mid-
nineteenth century, those American states that had abortion stat-
utes generally followed the preexisting English law.64  By the late
1950s, however, most American jurisdictions banned abortion
unless it was necessary to save the mother's life.65 This view pre-
vailed until 1973, when the United States Supreme Court deliv-
ered the landmark abortion decision of Roe v. Wade.6 Since 1973,
the Supreme Court has decided many cases affecting a woman's
Pythagorean cult entering the medical profession. Id. The Pythagoreans believed that life
began at conception. Id.
60. State v. Timm, 12 N.W.2d 670, 671 (Wis. 1944). A fetus is "quick" as soon as the
mother can feel movement within her womb. Id.
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973)
62. Id. at 134. It is disputed whether aborting a quick fetus was a felony or a
misdemeanor. Id. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS AND RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 188
(3d ed. 1982). It was a misdemeanor to cause a miscarriage of a quick fetus unless the
operation was necessary to save the mother's life. Id.
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 136. In 1803, Lord Ellenborough's Act made abortion of quick
fetuses a capital crime but established less severe penalties for abortions performed prior to
quickening. Id.
64. See CONN. GEN. STAT., tit. 20, § 14 (1821). In 1821, Connecticut became the first
state to enact abortion legislation when it adopted the part of Lord Ellenborough Act which
criminalized abortions of quick fetuses. Id. Connecticut also criminalized abortion prior to
quickening in 1860. CONN. PUB. ACTS, c. 71, § 1 (1860). See also Eugene Quay, Justifiable
Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. LJ. 395 (1961). This source contains a
more detailed description of the statutes within the states at this period. Id. at 435-38. See
generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 147-50. There are three general reasons to explain the
nineteenth century criminal abortion statutes: (1) to discourage illicit sexual conduct, (2) to
protect women from the real hazards of early abortions, and (3) to protect states' interests in
prenatal life. Id.
65. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139. See also Quay, supra note 64, at 447- 520 (detailed appendix
of abortion statutes within the United States and its territories up to 1960).
66. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe Court divided gestation into trimesters and
prescribed different rules for abortions in each. Id. at 164-65. During the first trimester, a
state cannot ban or closely regulate abortion, because it has no valid or compelling interest
in fetal health. Id. at 163-64. A state can, however, require that abortions be performed by
licensed physicians. Id. at 165. During the second trimester, a state may protect an interest
in a mother's health by regulating abortion procedures in ways that are reasonably related
to her health, but no flat bans are permitted. Id. at 163-64. The state may still not protect a
fetus' life during this period. Id. During the third trimester, the fetus is viable, and the
state has a compelling interest in this life. Id. The state can regulate or proscribe abortion
unless it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 164-65. The
woman's interest is fundamental and can only be outweighed if there is a compelling state
interest and the state's statute is narrowly drawn to that interest. Id. at 152-55. The Court
initially concluded that a woman's right to privacy included abortion. Id. at 153-54.
However, the state argued that the fetus was a "person" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 156-57. If so, the Fourteenth Amendment would have
guaranteed the fetus'/person's right to life. Id. After an analysis of the term "person," as it
was used throughout the United States Constitution, the Court concluded that none of the
references had prenatal applications. Id. at 157-58. The Court then concluded that since
abortion laws were much freer throughout the nineteenth century (than in the 1970s), a
fetus should not be considered a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 158.
180 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:171
right to have an abortion, but none have directly overturned
Roe.67
Roe v. Wade has had substantial impact on the legal status of
the fetus well beyond abortion. Courts cite Roe as support for cases
ranging from civil tort actions6s to murder.69
67. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state may refuse to provide Medicaid
funding for nontherapeutic abortions); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (invalidated
a statute that required a determination of whether a fetus was viable before abortion);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (states or federal government may refuse to fund
medically necessary abortions); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)
(a requirement of a second physician at abortions reasonably furthers a state's compelling
interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Court striking a state law requiring use
of the abortion method providing the best opportunity for the unborn child to survive). But
see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (Justices White,
Kennedy, and Rehnquist calling the rigid trimester system of Roe "'unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice' "); Fowler, The War Within the States, 41 NAT'L REV. 35, 35-36
(1989) ("Whatever the disputes about the Supreme Court's Webster decision, virtually
everyone understands it as an invitation to state regulation of abortion."); Susan R. Estrich
& Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 119, 121 (1989) (Webster left the Court with four justices prepared to affirm Roe v.
Wade (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens), four to eviscerate (White, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Rehnquist), and Justice O'Connor somewhere in between); James Bopp and
Richard E. Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1989). In Webster,
the Court did not strike any of Missouri's abortion regulations. Id. at 158. "This new
willingness to uphold state regulation of abortion is a marked change" from previous cases.
Id.
Since Webster, two justices have resigned: Brennan and Marshall, both of whom would
affirm Roe. The two new justices, David Souter and Clarence Thomas, have both been
appointed by Republican President George Bush. The Republican Party (and President
Bush) commonly advocates that increased power of decision be given to the states and that
abortion be outlawed or at least more closely regulated.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a case from the Third
Circuit concerning abortion regulations. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d
Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1992) (No. 91-942). The Third
Circuit court held that it was constitutional for the state to require either parental consent
for females under 18 or a court ruling that consent was not required. Id. at 707-09. The
court also upheld the statute requiring a doctor to give pre-abortion counseling and then
wait 24 hours before performing an abortion. Id. at 703-07. Advocates on both sides of the
abortion issue have said that they expect the Supreme Court to use Planned Parenthood to
either undermine or overturn Roe v. Wade. High Court to Hear Abortion Case: Stage Is Set
for Roe vs. Wade, STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 1992, at IA, 1lA. However, law professors
Laurence Tribe (Harvard) and Susan Bloch (Georgetown) both stated that they doubt that
the Court will use Planned Parenthood to overturn Roe. Id. at I IA. The justices said they
would review the provisions of the state law which require a 24-hour waiting period, pre-
abortion counselling by the doctor, recordkeeping requirements, and husband notification.
Id. Planned Parenthood will be argued in April of 1992 and probably decided by July. Id.
Cf. Walter Dellinger, What Comes After Roe v. Wade? N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at A23. It
may be possible for Congress to pass a law upholding Roe by using its ability to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty. Id.
68. See In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (Fam. Ct. 1990) (since Roe
says states can mandate that a woman complete a pregnancy after viability, it follows that
states must protect the fetus from abuse and neglect at this point); Chrisafogeorgis v.
Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 94 (Ill. 1973) (Ryan, J., dissenting ) (judge in a wrongful death
case claimed his position that a fetus was not a person was supported by the Roe decision);
Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). In Toth, a woman suffered a
miscarriage of a nonviable fetus due to a car accident. Id. The court stated that it was
necessary to read precedent in light of Roe, since Roe had had a considerable impact on the
legal status of the fetus. Id.
69. People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1976) (killing of pre-viable fetus
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2. Other Crimes
In order to be charged with homicide due to prenatal injuries,
most states require that a child be born alive and then die from the
injuries.7 0 Of the states that have codified murder of the unborn
(excluding legal abortions) or have expanded their common law to
include it, a few impose liability at every stage of development.7 1
Most retain some development requirement, such as viability or
quickness.7 2 One state distinguishes the killing of a quick child
from the killing of a mother, by clarifying that killing the unborn is
manslaughter, while killing the mother is murder.7 3
In those states that have not codified murder of the unborn,
judges frequently apply their states' murder statutes to the inten-
tional deaths of fetuses (excluding abortions with the mother's con-
sent), even though "fetuses" are not specifically included in the
statutes.74 Quite often, judges need to construe a certain term
is not murder, since Roe says there is no human life until viability); Wallace v. Wallace, 421
A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980). In Wallace, the court stated as follows:
We remark also in passing that it would be incongruous for a mother to have a
federal constitutional right to deliberately destroy a nonviable fetus (Roe v.
Wade), and at the same time for a third person to be subject to liability to the
fetus for his unintended but merely negligent acts.
Id. at 137.
70. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985). The overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions within the United States which have considered the issue have held that a
criminally caused death of a fetus is not homicide unless the fetus was born alive. Id. at 628-
29.
71. State v. Meril, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2633 (1990).
Minnesota, Arizona, and Indiana impose liability at any stage of development. Id. at 321.
Arizona and Indiana have penalties that are less severe (than murder of a born person) for
the killing of a fetus, but Minnesota's penalties for murder of a fetus and for murder of a
born person are identical. 1d. See also ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(AX5) (1989) (five
year sentence for "[k]nowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child at any
stage of its development by any physical injury to the mother of such child which would be
murder if the death of the mother had occurred"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-6 (Burns
1985) (two year sentence that does not apply to legal abortion); MINN. STAT. § 145.412
(1990) (legal abortions excluded from Crimes Against Children statute).
72. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988) (with the exception of legal
abortions, killing of a fetus with malice aforethought is murder); People v. Hamilton, 774
P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1961 (1990) (refining case law by explaining
that there is a need to show a fetus attained viability before it will be considered murder);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (Class "C" felony-feticide-to intentionally
terminate a pregnancy after the second trimester); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1982). If
someone other than the mother destroys the life of an unborn child, that person could be
fined $5,000 or be imprisoned for three years, or both. Id. If the fetus was quick, the
imprisonment can increase to fifteen years. Id.
73. State v. Willis, 457 So. 2d 959, 960 (Miss. 1984). The court also clarified that the
manslaughter charge and the murder charge do not merge. Id. For a discussion of the
history of the quickening distinction, see supra notes 62-65.
74. People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978). The defendant was
convicted of murder of a 22-24-week-old fetus after having repeatedly struck and raped its
mother with an avowed intent to kill her unborn child. Id. at 833-34. The murder was
considered a crime against the fetus, and the rape was considered a crime against the
mother. Id. at 840.
In addition, courts have extended the statutes to fetuses in vehicular homicide.
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within a statute (such as "person '' 75 or "child"7 6 ) to include a fetus.
3. Discrimination
Two relevant areas of discrimination which relate to fetuses
are (1) discrimination against the fetus and (2) discrimination
against the mother due to her pregnancy or ability to become
pregnant.
a. Discrimination Against a Fetus
Most courts have held that a person cannot claim a civil rights
violation under section 1983 of chapter 42 of the United States
Code77 for actions that occurred while the person was still a
fetus.78 However, there are two notable exceptions: Douglas v.
Town of Hartford79 and Crumpton v. Gates. °
In Douglas, the plaintiff was a fetus at the time he allegedly
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984). The Cass court indicated that, in
the future, recovery for the death of a fetus caused by a drunk driver would be allowed. Id.
at 1325. The court held that the state's vehicular homicide statute applied because the
legislature did not distinguish between pre-born and born individuals by using the term
"person" in the statute. Id. at 1325-27. The court also could not discover any reason to
uphold an arbitrary distinction based on birth. Id. at 1325-26. But see Hollis v.
Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983). In Hollis, an estranged husband of a pregnant
woman forced his hand into her vagina, intending to destroy the child. Id. at 61-62. The
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the man could be charged with first degree assault and
illegal abortion, but not with homicide. Id. at 65.
75. E.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass. 1984). A viable fetus
is a person for purposes of vehicular homicide statute. Id.
[T]he word "person" is synonymous with the term "human being." An offspring
of human parents cannot reasonably be considered to be other than a human
being, and therefore a person, first within, and then in normal course outside,
the womb. As will be shown later in this opinion, heretofore the law has not
recognized that the pre-born could be the victims of homicide because of
difficulties in proving the cause of death; but problems in proving causation do
not detract from the personhood of the victim ....
Id. at 1325.
76. E.g., In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (child abuse
statute applied to unborn).
77. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
78. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979) (holding
that 1983 actions are derivative actions); Harman v. Danials, 525 F. Supp. 798, 802 (W.D.
Va. 1981) (no civil rights protections for fetuses); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1382
(N.D. Fla. 1974 ), aff'd in part mem. 516 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975) (no civil rights protections
for the unborn).
79. 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982).
80. 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
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suffered injuries due to police officers beating his mother.81 The
plaintiff sued the city and fictitious police officers for police brutal-
ity in violation of section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.8
2
The court held that a fetus should be considered a person under
section 1983, basing its opinion on the trend in state courts toward
greater legal rights for the unborn.83
In Crumpton, six-year-old John H. Crumpton IV also brought
a civil rights action under section 1983.84 His claim against Los
Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates (among many others) alleged
that the killing of his father violated his constitutional rights.8 5
The district court, relying on Roe, granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, since John was a two-month-old fetus when
his father was killed and thus not a "person" within section 1983.86
The court of appeals overturned the lower court's decision, distin-
guishing Crumpton's situation from other cases involving physical
injuries to a fetus caused by beating of pregnant mothers.87 The
court of appeals claimed that physical injuries exist at the time of
the beating-when the victim is a fetus (and not a "person").'
However, John Crumpton IV's injuries (the loss of a familial rela-
tionship with his father) existed only after his birth. 9 Therefore,
John H. Crumpton IV was a "person" at the time of his injury and
81. Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (D. Conn. 1982). The
plaintiff claimed that he was physically injured when his mother was hit on the head with a
night stick after she attempted to aid her sister in a dispute with police officers. Id.
82. Id. at 1268-69. The mother (also a plaintiff) was a black adult who claimed that she
had done nothing to justify the beating. Id. at 1269. The infant plaintiff claimed that he
was entitled to relief for the alleged civil rights violation. Id. at 1268. The defendant
argued that since the plaintiff was a fetus at the time of the injury, he could not be
considered a "person" under the statute. Id. at 1268-69.
83. Douglas, 542 F. Supp. at 1270. The court then cited, as examples, a Connecticut
negligence case (Simon v. Mullin, 380 A.2d 1353 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977)), a California
murder case (Justus v. Atchinson, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977)), and an Illinois wrongful death
case (Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88 (I11. 1973)). Id. at 1270.
84. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1991). The details of the case
were more fully described by the National Law Journal. Gail Diane Cox, 9th Circuit
Ponders Fetal Rights, NAT'L' L. J., Apr. 22, 1991, at 3, 30. There were outstanding federal
warrants for John H. Crumpton III and Jane E. Berry, yet the Los Angeles Police
Department chose to put the pair under surveillance rather than arrest them. Id. at 3. The
police watched the suspects for 18 days as they stole a car and prepared to rob a bank. Id.
The officers set a trap for them by their getaway car. Id. Mr. Crumpton did not have a gun,
and Ms. Berry's gun was not fired, yet in the end the officers shot him in the back 40 times
and shot her 13 times, claiming the pair ignored a demand to surrender and reached for
their waistbands. Id. Mr. Crumpton died. Id. Ms. Berry survived and seven months later
gave birth to John Crumpton IV. Id.
85. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1419.
86. Id. at 1420.
87. Id. at 1422.
88. Id.
89. Id. "[A] familial right cannot arise until a fetus is born and suffers from not having a
parent." Id.
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could claim a violation of his rights under section 1983.90
b. Discrimination Against a Mother
Women have historically been discriminated against on the
basis of their pregnancy or ability to become pregnant.91 The
recent International Union v. Johnson Controls92 holding over-
turned a company policy forbidding women of child-bearing age
(whose infertility was not medically documented)93 from working
in certain areas of a battery plant.94 The Supreme Court decided
that the policy was facially discriminatory and that Johnson Con-
trols failed to establish that gender was a bona fide occupational
qualification for the job.95 The Court based its decision on Title
VII,96 stating that pregnant employees must be treated the same
as other employees in work-related issues, unless the pregnancy
affects their ability to work.97 The Court held that the safety of the
unconceived fetuses of employees was not essential to battery
90. Id. at 1423-24.
91. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Court held that women in the
laundry business could not work more than ten hours a day. Id. at 423. The Court stated as
follows:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is
especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they
are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long
time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects
upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the
physical well-being of [the] woman becomes an object of public interest and care
in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. at 421.
92. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
93. International Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989). The court of
appeals clarified that "medically documented" means that the women need some medical
confirmation that they cannot bear children. Id. at 877-78. The women were not
encouraged to change their status by some sterilization procedure. Id. at 878.
94. Id. The policy was an attempt by the company to protect future children from the
harmful effects of the high lead concentrations in the plant. Id. at 877.
95. International Union v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
97. International Union, 111 S. Ct. at 1203 n.3. This Pregnancy Discrimination
Amendment added subsection (k) to section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" [in Title VIII include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes.., as persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work ....
Id. Though working while in advanced pregnancy is a risk for the fetus, Congress has deter-
mined that the employer can only consider the employee's ability to do her job. Id. at 1207.
See also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). "The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimi-
nation based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex." Id.
at 684.
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manufacturing.98 The fetuses were not customers9 9 (comparing
the fetuses to airline passengers) 00 or third parties 1° (such as
prison inmates).' 0 2 Therefore, decisions about their health and
welfare should have been left to the future parents, rather than to
the employers. 10 3
D. PROPERTY LAW
Property law has been far more consistent than the other
areas of law previously discussed. Historically, if the fetus existed
at the time of the death of a testator, then the fetus was treated as
a person for the purpose of inheritance, as long as the fetus was
eventually born alive.'0 4 The Rule Against Perpetuities required
that an interest in property had to vest, if at all, no later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the time the interest
was created. 10 5 A period of gestation was added to this twenty-
one-year period-typically nine months. '0 6 This indicates that the
probate courts recognize life from the probable point of concep-
tion. One court summarized the history of property law: "It has
been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common law
courts in respect to estate matters for at least the past two hundred
years that a child 'in ventre sa mere' is 'born' and 'alive' for all
purposes for his benefit."'1 0 7
98. International Union, 111 S. Ct. at 1206.
99. Id. at 1205-06.
100. Id. (citing Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)). In Criswell, the
Court considered age-related abilities as relevant to the job of a flight engineer due to the
safety of the passengers. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 401.
101. International Union, 111 S. Ct. at 1205-06.
102. Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)). In Dothard, the Court
allowed discrimination on the basis of gender, allowing a prison to hire only male guards in
maximum-security male penitentiaries where contact was possible. Dothard, 433 U.S. at
331. The Court said that gender was related to the guard's ability to maintain prison
security. Id. at 334-37.
103. International Union, 111 S. Ct. at 1207.
104. Christian v. Carter, 137 S.E. 596,597 (N.C. 1927). Fetuses were recognized in this
fashion, because it was presumed that their parents' neglect was due to oversight or
mistake. Id. See also Cowles v. Cowles, 13 A. 414 (Conn. 1887) (legally recognized the fetus
through the right of inheritance).
105. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.17 (1984). John
Chipman Fray made the classic statement describing the common law principle limiting
the creating of nonreversionary future interests: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if
at all, no later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."
Id.
106. Perkins v. Inglehart, 39 A.2d 672, 676 (Md. 1944). This case deals with a residuary
clause in a will. Id.
107. In re Holthausen's Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (Sur. Ct. 1941). The grandson of a
testator born more than eight months after testator's death was determined to be alive and
in being at the testator's death. Id. But see In re Peabody, 158 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1959). In
this case, a woman created a trust for her issue, and then attempted to amend it while she
was pregnant. Id. at 842. If the fetus had been "beneficially interested" by the trust, the
woman would not have been able to amend without the consent of the fetus. Id. The court
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Current medical advances have raised new property law
issues as well.108 For example, many current laws do not speak of
any period of gestation, but instead refer to children conceived
before a testator's death.'0 9 This change allows recovery for chil-
dren who were the products of in vitro fertilization and who were
implanted months after fertilization. 0
E. CHILD PROTECTION
Neglect and parental termination proceedings are neither
tort"' nor criminal. 1 2 In In re Valerie D., 113 the court clarified
that termination policies were part of the custody proceedings
that were intended to protect children's welfare and health;"'
thus, prenatal conduct of the mother should be binding."' Other
courts have added that unborn children should be protected by
these custody laws, since the laws were intended to be prevent-
ative as well as remedial." 6 Courts often cite, as precedent, cases
that have determined that a "child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body.""17  Consequently, women have
refused to bestow an eight-month-old fetus with the status of a "person beneficially
interested," holding that the mother only needed the consent of the born persons. Id. at
845.
108. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Court determined that
human-made, live micro-organisms are patentable. Id. at 309.
109. Compare Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (Ch. 1798) (holding that
property rights could only be expanded to those children who were "in the womb at the
death of the testator") with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969) (extending the group to
those conceived before the testator's death).
110. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6150(c) (West 1991). "A person conceived before but born
after testator's death or after the time the devise is to take effect in enjoyment, as the case
may be, takes if answering the class description." Id.
111. Mother's Prenatal Conduct May Be Basis for Termination of Her Parental Rights,
17 FAM. L. REP. 1526 (1991). See also Long v. Long, 255 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1977). Tort
actions are different from custody proceedings because in tort, injury must be proved
before damages can be recovered. Id. at 143. In addition, rather than a protection goal,
tort law attempts to compensate the injured. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178
(Cal. 1967).
112. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(e) (1986).
Criminal law's broad aim is to prevent harm to society. Id. This is accomplished with
punishment and threats of punishment. Id.
113. 595 A.2d 922 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991), cert. granted in part, 221 Conn. 903, -. A.2d
- (Conn. 1991).
114. In re Valerie D., 595 A.2d 922, 924 (Conn., App. Ct. 1991), cert. granted in part,
221 Conn. 903, - A.2d - (Conn. 1991).
115. Id. at 925; In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("The
prenatal period is only pertinent because it is the sole asserted basis for establishing
jurisdiction based on neglect.").
116. Long v. Long, 255 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Iowa 1977). A mother and stepfather
appealed from an order terminating their parental rights. Id. at 141. "[Parental]
termination proceedings are not like tort actions where injury must be proved before
damages may be recovered. Our termination statute is preventative as well as remedial."
Id. at 143.
117. Smith v. Brenna, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960) ("[I]t is immaterial whether before
birth a child is considered a person in being. And regardless of analogies to other areas of
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been charged criminally and with child neglect when their chil-
dren were born with positive toxicology results." 8 Many of these
criminal charges have been unsuccessful. Consequently, prosecu-
tors have begun to arrest mothers for delivering drugs to their
infants in the short time after birth but before the umbilical cord is
severed. 119
Protection orders serve this same preventative goal and have
been used to protect the health and welfare of a fetus.' 20 In In re
Gloria C, a woman requested a protection order in favor of her
fetus to protect the unborn child from her husband.12 1 The court
granted the order, holding that birth is not a condition precedent
to protection12 2 and stating that there are many ways to harm a
fetus without harming the mother, so a protective order for her
the law, justice requires that the principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to
begin life with a sound mind and body."); Rosa H. Kim, Reconciling Fetal/Maternal
Conflicts, 27 IDAHo L. REV. 223, 230 (1990) ("In instances where courts have enforced the
interests of the fetus against the mother, they have justified their holdings by finding a right
to be born with 'sound mind and body' or by finding a 'compelling state interest' in
protecting fetal life, a rationale derived from Roe v. Wade."); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736,
739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). "Since a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind
and body, we believe it is within this best interest to examine all prenatal conduct bearing
on that right." Id. at 739 (citing Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971) (eight
year old's suit for brain damage due to pre-viability car accident)).
118. E.g., In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Div. 1990). Mothers were
charged with neglect when their children were born with a positive toxicology for cocaine.
Id. at 281. The judge determined that the children were neglected because "a positive
toxicology for cocaine in a newborn constitutes 'actual impairment ...."' Id. at 283. See
also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1991) (anyone physically
dependent on an addictive drug at birth is included within the definition of an abused
child); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981):
Whenever it shall appear that any child within this State is of such
circumstances that his welfare will be endangered unless proper care or custody
is provided, an application ... may be filed ... seeking that the Bureau of
Childrens Services accept and provide such care or custody of such child as the
circumstances may require .... The provisions of this section shall be deemed to
include an application on behalf of an unborn child ....
Id. But see Reyes v. State, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977). The court held that a child
endangerment statute did not apply to fetuses when the mother used heroin during preg-
nancy. Id. at 914.
119. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). A majority
held that a pregnant woman violated a statute regarding delivery of controlled substances
to a child. Id. at 419-20. The court stated that this was the only logical conclusion, since
the infant was born and a real person when the drugs passed through the umbilical cord.
Id. But see State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). The statute did not apply
to this span of life after birth but prior to severance of the umbilical cord. Id. at 53. See
generally Rorie Sherman, Courts Disagree on Mothers'Liability, NAT'L L.J., May 13, 1991,
at 30. In a National Law Journal /Lexis poll, a majority said that the mother "should be held
criminally responsible when she abuses substances during pregnancy and, as a result, gives
birth to an impaired child." Id.
120. In re Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991, 995 (Fam. Ct. 1984).
121. Id. at 991. The woman's husband beat her in an attempt to cause a miscarriage.
122. Id. at 998.
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was insufficient. 123
F. SUMMARY
The areas of tort law, criminal law, constitutional law, prop-
erty law, and child protection have each developed in a unique
fashion. Similar trends flow through multiple areas, such as "born-
alive" and viability requirements. But more important than the
history and development of fetal rights is the current state of the
law. It is imperative to question whether each area of the law is
consistent, while adequately addressing the problems it purports
to confront.
II. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW
A. INTRODUCTION
We all have an interest in future generations. The health,
welfare, and quality of life of these children depends on the
actions we take today. The physical health, financial stability, and
moral/social values of our children will also be impacted by the
laws and court decisions concerning unborn children. To this end,
the Supreme Court decided that states have legitimate and impor-
tant interests in "protecting the potentiality of human life"' 24 and
in promoting quality of life after birth.125 This could be achieved
by promoting a fetus' interest in being born healthy126 or by rec-
ognizing an unborn's interest in either not being conceived or not
being born. 127
Individual development in each area of the law as it attempts
to meet these interests is justifiable, but the resulting status quo is
not necessarily logical, consistent, or adequate. Advances in medi-
cal technology have changed our perceptions about the unborn.
As scientists reveal more information about the individuality of the
123. Id. at 992. The court cited, as an example, the ingestion of drugs that are harmless
to an adult but dangerous to a fetus. Id.
124. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
125. Id. at 163.
126. E.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.
1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). The health of the child was promoted
by requiring the mother to have a blood transfusion while pregnant. Id. at 537-38.
127. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to
shield the parents from liability for the child's pain and suffering if the parents refuse to
abort a fetus they know to be seriously impaired); Margery W. Shaw, Conditional
Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984). Shaw argued that society
should prevent conception by requiring genetic counseling and carrier testing to reveal
who could pass on deleterious genes, and then encourage the use of contraceptives or
sterilization by making the parents liable in tort at the moment of conception. See id. at 93.
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fetus,' 28 perform amazing fetal surgeries, 2 9 and save babies who
previously would have fallen victim to premature births and
severe deformities,130 the focus of many legal rights has turned
from the mother to the fetus.'
3
'
These advances have obvious benefits to society, yet they also
create problems as courts and legislatures attempt to incorporate
complex fetal rights issues into the status quo while still maintain-
ing the same level of rights for everyone else affected.' 32
B. TORT LAW
1. General
Recovery by fetuses in tort law has been complicated by many
factors.'33 However, most of these factors should be irrelevant
when considering the purpose of tort law. Tort recoveries are
128. Jeffrey L. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J.
L. & MED. 1, 2 (1983). Most obstetricians prefer to view a mother and fetus as a single
entity with single interests. Id. This is easier because that single interest is furthered by
proper maternal care. Id. But these attitudes are changing as advances in fetal diagnosis
and care clearly distinguish a fetus and a mother for treatment purposes and thus
necessitate different types of care and treatment. Id.
129. Katherine A. Knopoff, Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79
CAL. L. REV. 499 (1991). Surgeons can now operate on fetuses while they are still
developing in the womb. Id. at 503. The most frequent and successful surgeries are those
which treat hydrocephalus (preventing severe mental and physical brain damage) and those
which treat obstructed urinary tracts. Id. at 503-04. See also Sandra Blakeslee, Fetus
Returned to Womb Following Surgery, N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 7, 1986, at Cl. In this case, a fetus
was removed from the mother, operated on, and then returned to the womb. Id.
130. See supra notes 128 and 129 (describing these life-saving procedures).
131. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951 (1986). The shift, and thus potential conflict with
care of the mother, has occurred because of the technology that enables doctors to visualize
the fetus, detect abnormalities, correct problems, and advise about the detrimental effects
of various substances and activities. Id. at 1951.
132. Johnsen, supra note 4.
[C]ourts (as well as legislatures) have felt constrained by the existing law as
developed for born persons and have considered the granting of fetal rights an
all-or-nothing proposition. They have mistakenly viewed their options as being
limited to either granting the fetus personhood status without regard to either
the context or the parties involved, or denying the very existence of the fetus. It
is thus not surprising that these lawmakers have extended the rights of persons
to fetuses when faced with instances of clear harm and injustice, such as when an
assailant negligently or willfully destroys a fetus through violence to a pregnant
woman.
Courts have also employed unnecessarily simplistic reasoning when
adopting the other extreme and refusing to recognize the existence of the fetus
at all.
Id. at 609-10.
133. Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the
Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982). Examples of these
complicating factors follow: (1) There are survival and wrongful death actions if not born
alive, and wrongful life if born alive but injured. Id. at 270- 71. Many different parties have
actions. Id. at 271. (2) The actions can be determined by injuries at many different stages of
development. Id. (3) Many people question whether we should protect the unborn, the
mother, or both. Id. at 271-72.
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intended to compensate for the harms inflicted by a tortfeasor.134
Keeping this objective in mind, it is apparent that many courts and
legislatures have based their opinions on faulty reasoning.' 35
Courts often feel compelled to rest their decisions on the holding
of Roe v. Wade. For example, many judges have difficulty holding
a third person liable for an injury to a fetus when a mother can
intentionally terminate the fetus at the same stage of develop-
ment.136 Relying on Roe in tort cases is in error for many reasons.
First, the Court did not hold that a fetus has no rights, or even no
constitutional rights. 3 7 The Court held that a fetus has no Four-
teenth Amendment rights.13 8 Second, the Court upheld the right
to abortion due to the importance of a mother's right to privacy.13 9
Wrongful death and tort recoveries do not infringe on constitu-
tionally protected rights of privacy. 4 ° Third, there were balanc-
134. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing of the purpose of the tort
recoveries).
135. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949).
[T]he courts recognized the beneficence of the common law for the protection
of unborn infants against the criminal conduct of others and as to inheritance
and property rights without saying that such protection and rights exist as
exceptions or statutory declarations. But when they follow the principle of the
Dietrich case and deny a cause of action to infants on the ground that the unborn
child is not a separate and legal entity, they do nothing to reconcile the
contradiction or... the anomaly between the common law rights in favor of the
infant, which they recognize, and the natural right of the infant to have
compensation for pre-natal injuries negligently inflicted, which they do not
recognize.
Id. at 338-39.
136. See, e.g., Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 298, 302 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). There is
an inherent conflict in holding a third party liable for negligently but unintentionally
causing a pregnancy to end, when a mother can intentionally terminate the pregnancy at
the same time. Id. The same argument has been made in dissenting opinions. See
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 95 (Ill. 1973) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
With the leeway conferred upon the States within which they may authorize or
proscribe abortion by statute, it would appear that, to avoid apparent or actual
inconsistencies in the law, any right of action created for the wrongful death of
an unborn child should be correlated with the provisions of the statute
pertaining to abortions.
Id. at 95.
137. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). But see McGarvey v. Magee-Womens
Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). This was a
pre-Roe case that held that a fetus has no protections under the Constitution. Id. at 754.
138. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
139. Id. at 154.
140. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 133, at 274. Parness and Pritchard added that
courts often cite reasons in addition to reliance on Roe, such as speculative damages and
proof of causation, but then condemned these reasons as well because they only pertain to
the difficulty of proof. Id. See also Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 140 (N.H. 1980)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("In whatever manner the United States Supreme Court chooses to
define 'persons' for [F]ourteenth [A]mendment purposes, it is not binding on this court with
regard to ... death actions."); Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 305 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)
(Maher, J., dissenting) ("We are not concerned with the right of a mother to freely
terminate her pregnancy at a certain stage. Rather we have the case of a wrongful and
unwanted termination. Certainly a tortfeasor cannot invoke the mother's privacy rights to
defend his wrongdoing.").
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ing tests (such as mothers and their doctors versus the states) used
in Roe which do not apply to tort cases. 141 Fourth, the viability
divisions so clearly delineated by Roe 142 are irrelevant when con-
sidering the purposes of tort recovery. 143 Tort recovery is meant
to compensate,144 so it should not matter whether a fetus was
injured before or after the point at which survival outside of the
womb is possible.145 Since harm to a child may have been caused
by acts prior to the child's conception, viability requirements also
unfairly prevent compensation for these injuries. 146
141. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. The mother's potential interests in whether to give birth
and the state's potential interests in the health of the mothers and fetuses sometimes
conflict. Id. at 162-63. These interests were balanced in Roe, using the trimester system.
Id. at 163-65. In the first trimester of pregnancy, the woman's interests outweigh the
state's. Id. at 163-64. In the second trimester, the state's interest in the mother's health
outweighs the state's interest in the fetus and the woman's interest in abortion. Id. In the
third trimester, the state's interest in the potentiality of human life outweighs the woman's
interest in abortion. Id. at 164-65.
142. Id. at 162-66.
143. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504-05 (N.J. 1960) (infant born injured due to car
accident prior to infant's birth).
The most important consideration, however, is that the viability distinction has
no relevance to the injustice of denying recovery for harm which can be proved
to have resulted from the wrongful act of another. Whether viable or not at the
time of the injury, the child sustains the same harm after birth, and therefore
should be given the same opportunity for redress.
Although the viability distinction has no real justification, it is explainable
historically. The Dietrich case announced a theory that an unborn child was part
of its mother. The first dissent from this proposition, by Justice Boggs in the
Allaire case pointed out that an unborn child who could sustain life apart from its
mother could not be considered part of her. The logical appeal of Justice Boggs'
approach, coupled with the understandable conservatism of the earlier courts
who broke with the Dietrich theory, resulted in a rule of recovery limited by the
viability distinction. But the usefulness of that distinction has disappeared with
the modern repudiation of the Dietrich theory. And since it has no cogent
medical reason to support it, and no relevancy to the harm resulting from
prenatal injury, we do not believe that it has any place in the determination of
the question of liability for wrongful conduct.
Id. See also Lenow, supra note 128, at 28. "An unborn child's rights should not depend
upon the fetus reaching the Roe Court's elusive 'point of viability' before a state may pro-
tect them." Id. The point does not have to be earlier or later, just more appropriate. Id. at
28-29. The decision is best suited to an interdisciplinary ad hoc committee. Id. at 29. Cf.
James J. Diamon, Humanizing the Abortion Debate, AMERICA, July 19, 1969, at 36-37. "In
this day of DNA synthesis, test-tube incubation, intra-uterine transfusions, talk in high cir-
cles of chromosomal manipulation and in vitro generation, the 20-week survivability stan-
dard is about as sacred as the four-minute mile." Id. But cf. Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Uncontradicted medical evidence suggests that a "20-
week fetus is not viable." Id. at 515 (quoting Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 662 F.
Supp. 407, 420 (D. Mo. 1987)).
144. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of tort
recovery.
145. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d
134, 135 (N.H. 1980). Viability does not matter if the fetus is later born alive, because then
the action is for the suffering of a live person. Id. at 135-36.
146. David A. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579, 589 (1965);
William J. Maledon, Note, The Law of the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical
Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 349 (1971). "It is as irrational to choose birth,
quickening, or viability as the point at which life is to be legally protected as it is to choose
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2. Wrongful Death and Wrongful Life
Wrongful death suits are obviously not intended to compen-
sate the fetus, since the fetus is no longer alive. Instead, these
recoveries are intended to compensate the people who are
harmed by the loss of the fetus.14 7 Viability should only be consid-
ered if courts and legislatures really believe that parents are
harmed by the death of their fetuses only after the magical point
of viability and not before. Certainly there needs to be some end
to liability, 14 but that line should be drawn according to the prox-
imity of the cause instead of the fetus' development. 149
The possibility of a wrongful life suit would be terrifying for
any parent who is morally opposed to aborting a fetus due to its
deformities. In Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,'50  the
court suggested that parents could be sued for not aborting chil-
dren who would be born deformed.' 5 ' In this case, the legislature
stepped in and prevented suits of this type,5'5 but the possibility
remains for other jurisdictions to follow the suggestion of the Cali-
fornia court. Suing parents for not aborting deformed children is
consistent with the purpose of protecting future children, but
inconsistent with the Roe holding, which grants women the free-
dom to choose whether or not to abort a fetus.' 53
the age of six months, seven years, or the age of adult majority as the Roman law essentially
did." Id. at 371.
147. See supra note 22 (discussing the purpose of tort recovery). Contra Amadio v.
Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985). The real objective of these lawsuits was not to compensate
the parents of the deceased children for their emotional distress. Id. at 1088. This
compensation theory perpetuates the mistake that an unborn child is inseparable from the
mother. Id. The recovery is intended to pay for the economic losses (funeral and medical
expenses) of the child's estate. Id.
148. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill. 1973) (Ryan, J., dissenting)
(line should be birth because of its definiteness, preciseness, and observability); Wallace v.
Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 136 (N.H. 1980). In Wallace, the viability distinction was created in
an attempt to increase the circle of liability beyond birth. Id. Including pre-viable fetuses
within this circle would extend liability even more. Id. The zone of liability should not be
based on logic or science, but some reasonable limit to liability. Id. "The ordinary meaning
of death presupposes live birth .... Life may begin with conception but causes of action do
not." Id. at 136-37.
149. There are two incompatible views as to determining the cause of an injury. See
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). With fetal rights issues, states could
apply either Cardozo's foreseeability approach, see id. at 101, or Andrew's dissent espousing
the directness approach. See id. at 103-04.
150. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980).
151. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980). The court
could not discover a sound public policy that would protect parents from answering for the
misery, pain, and suffering they inflict on their children and felt that abortion would
prevent this harm to the children. Id. at 488.
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982). "No cause of action arises against a parent
of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been conceived or, if
conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive." Id. This also cannot be
raised as a defense in an action against a third party. Id.




Considering a fetus to be a patient with a right to receive
informed consent could be viewed as duplicative, since the doctor
must go through the parent anyway. Cases requiring this
informed consent and extending the period of recovery for fetuses
are further examples of attempts to protect fetuses and to
strengthen their rights.154 This demonstrates that courts believe
fetuses need protection from dangerous surgeries and medical
procedures. Parents must make conscious decisions on behalf of
the health and welfare of the child.
4. Forced Surgery
Forced surgeries do not follow the general tort law concern-
ing volunteerism.155  Usually, one individual is not obligated to
help another, even if failing to do so will result in death.1 56 There
are certain exceptions to this general rule for carriers, innkeepers,
employers, shopkeepers, social guests, prisoners, students, and
others with special relationships.' 57 Criminal and child protection
statutes have sometimes recognized duties of parents to aid chil-
dren, 15  and tort law may extend these duties to parents as well,' 59
but surgery on a fetus is far more intrusive than requiring a parent
154. See, e.g., Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816-18 (App. Div. 1983).
155. Kim, supra note 117, at 239. The rule that one person is not obliged to help
another suggests that freedom of choice (of whether or not to aid someone) is more
important than protecting human life. Id. See also KEETON, supra note 20, at 375. The law
has traditionally refused to impose moral obligations on strangers to aid other human
beings. Id.
156. See KEETON, supra note 20, at 375. This is true even if a life depends on a simple
act from a stranger in a position to help. See also Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla.
1955). A 16-year-old boy lost his hand from hammering on a homemade explosive. Id. at
758. The boy was at the neighbor's house, and the neighbors witnessed what he was doing,
but they only told him not to make a mess and to get away from the shed so he would not
blow it up. Id. The court said that the neighbors had no duty to prevent the boy's accident.
Id. at 759. Sometimes courts have not extended a duty to aid even when that person's act
may have added to the victim's peril. Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928). In
Osterlind, the defendant rented a canoe to someone he knew to be intoxicated. Id. at 302.
The canoe tipped, and the intoxicated man called for help for a half an hour. Id. The
defendant ignored the calls, and the man drowned. Id. The court held that the defendant
had no duty to help the drowning man. Id.
157. KEETON, supra note 20, at 376-77; Yu v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.,
144 A.2d 56 (Conn. 1958) (carrier had duty to make reasonable efforts to aid passenger in
danger); Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 20 S.E.2d 299, 305 (N.C. 1942) (if plaintiff was
injured through the fault of the defendant in not taking the proper precautions to protect
travelers, then the defendant should have helped the plaintiff, rather than leave him
unconscious for almost an hour).
158. KEETON, supra not 20, at 377; CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988)
(misdemeanor to willfully omit to furnish necessary medical care to one's child); Katherine
A. Knopoff, Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79 CAL. L. REV. 499,
523 (1991) (affirmative duty on parents through child neglect statutes to aid their children
based on the special parent-child relationship).
159. KEETON, supra note 20, at 377.
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to seek medical care for an ill child.16 0
Since forced surgery naturally raises issues of privacy, courts
have questioned whether Roe prohibits surgery. One court
argued that since a greater includes a lesser, a mother can refuse
surgery if she can abort.161 Others have rejected the Roe analysis,
claiming the privacy right is not implicated, since a mother has
chosen to give birth.162
5. Summary
Notice the inherent conflicts in the current state of tort law.
Some children have injuries caused by the actions of tortfeasors
160. Knopoff, supra note 39, at 525. Donald Regan has made personal predictions
concerning a parent's obligation to submit to surgery for a child. Donald H. Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). Regan believes that if a case were
presented in order to determine whether a parent had a duty to donate a kidney or bone
marrow to a born child, it would be likely that no duty would be found. Id. at 1586. This is
in spite of the fact that neither donating one kidney nor donating bone marrow have long
term effects on the donor. Id. See also Committee on Ethics of the Am. College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists Op. No. 55, Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Oct.
1987) reprinted in IRA MARK ELLMAN, ET AL., FAMILY LAW, 1152 (1991).
The role of the obstetrician should be one of informed education and counsellor
.... The use of courts to resolve ... conflict ... is almost never warranted.
Obstetricians should refrain from performing procedures that are unwanted by
pregnant women. The use of judicial authority to implement treatment
regimens in order to protect the fetus violates the pregnant woman's autonomy.
Furthermore, inappropriate reliance on judicial authority may lead to
undesirable societal consequences, such as the criminalization of noncompliance
with medical recommendations.
Id. Professor Tribe discussed this issue from a constitutional perspective. When someone's
bodily integrity is at stake, procedurally adequate protections are needed because physical
pain is irreparable and final. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1329-37 (1988). A Pennsylvania state court phrased the concept even more vividly.
For a society, which respects the right of one individual, to sink its teeth into the
jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for
another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence.
Forcible extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind.
Such would raise the spectre of the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of
the horrors this portends.
McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90, 92 (1978).
161. Lenow, supra note 128, at 23. It is odd that a state can require a mother to have
fetal surgery and then have no recourse if she chooses to abort. Id. See also Kevin M.
Apollo, Comment, The Biological Father's Right to Require a Pregnant Woman to Undergo
Medical Treatment Necessary to Sustain Fetal Life, 94 DICK. L. REV. 199 (1989). Perhaps
fathers of unborn children should be able to require treatment when the mother objects.
Id. at 199-200.
162. In re Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991, 997 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (fetus was
granted a protection order). See also Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions
What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987).
Fetal rights theorists assume that Roe's analysis of the scope of the abortion
right also determines a woman's rights in the coerced medical treatment
context. But the pregnant woman's right to shape her own medical care and
that of her unborn child draws upon a wider range of precedents, demands a
distinct analysis and balancing test, and requires a fresh examination of Roe
itself.
Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted).
and yet are unable to recover, due to the stage of their develop-
ment when the torts were committed. Why should tortfeasors be
exempt from these burdens? Why should the children and the
children's families pay for the mistakes of others?
Tort recovery requires the establishment of many factors.
Causation is always a factor, and it should not be treated any differ-
ently here. If the plaintiff cannot prove causation using any of the
acceptable means, then the plaintiff fails. But if a duty exists and
medical advances enable the plaintiff to sufficiently prove causa-
tion, and that cause is not so remote as to shock the conscience,
then the only fair result is to hold the tortfeasor liable.
Plaintiffs in wrongful death and wrongful life cases should
recover using the same logic. The triers of fact consider many fac-
tors in order to determine the extent of recovery allowed in a
given case. These same triers of fact are equally qualified to judge
the loss inflicted on a plaintiff when the victim is a fetus.
There are benefits to the medical and scientific advances con-
cerning fetuses, but if left unchecked, it is possible that the bene-
fits will be outweighed by the harms. Forced medical care and
surgery are intrusive to pregnant women but are often necessary
for the life or health of the child. Forced abortions of deformed
fetuses assumes that some legislature or court could define what
would be an acceptable form.
Courts frequently hold that the state's interests in the life or
health of the fetus outweigh the rights of the mother. Does the
state not have an equally strong interest in the life of the prover-
bial drowning person?'6 3 If so, the state should force the expert
swimmer to rescue the drowning victim. Certainly a mother has
closer ties to her unborn child-probably even a "special relation-
ship." But if the freedom to choose whether or not to aid another
person is so important, then why is a special relationship enough to
coerce actions as intrusive as surgery upon nonconsenting adults?
If courts are going to allow these medical procedures, they need to
explain the distinctions between the instances when a court can
force an adult to submit to surgery and treatment and other cases
(such as volunteerism and abortion) when adults are left to their
own consciences.
163. E.g., Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (defendant in position to assist
did nothing while drowning man called for help).
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. Definition of a Person
Roe v. Wade held that a fetus is not a person within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 64 This holding should not
apply to fetal rights in other contexts.1 6
5
The debate over personhood status still causes many
problems. Courts have had difficulty including fetuses within cer-
tain precedents and statutes. Some courts simply declare that
fetuses are persons for certain purposes.166 Many other courts
believe that the decision must be "all-or-nothing": either the fetus
is a person and therefore entitled to all of the rights of any other
person, or it is not a person and has no rights in its current state.
167
164. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
165. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 133, at 269 ("Roe Court only held that a pre-
viable fetus is not a 'person' enjoying fourteenth amendment protection"); Smith v.
Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960) ("The semantic argument whether an unborn child
is a 'person in being' seems to us to be beside the point. There is no question that
conception sets in motion biological processes which if undisturbed will produce what
everyone will concede to be a person in being.").
166. Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
"Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986). It is
more appropriate to say that a fetus is not a person but does have certain rights than it is to
say that sometimes a fetus is a person and sometimes it is not. Id. at 738.
167. Johnsen, supra note 4, at 609-10. See also William Saletan, If Fetuses Are
People.... 201 NEW REPUBLIC 18 (1989). A month after the Supreme Court reinstated a
Missouri statute declaring that life begins at conception, a federal lawsuit was filed against
state officials for jailing a fetus of a female prisoner without due process. Id. The complaint
stated that it was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to jail one person for the crime
of another. Id. Other people in the state wondered about changes in the welfare
payments, food stamp allowances, and other possibilities with nine months added to
everyone's age. Id. There were some interesting arguments before the Ninth Circuit
concerning this same philosophy. Gail Diane Cox, 9th Circuit Ponders Fetal Rights, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 22, 1991, at 3, 30. A case that was recently before the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals (Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991)), concerned a child who was
born after police officers shot both of his parents (his father died after 40 shots; his mother
survived with 13). Id. at 3. The child is now eight years old and is suing for the death of his
father. Id. Prior to oral arguments, the plaintiff's attorney said he looked forward to
listening to conservative judges trying to say that a fetus is a person for abortion purposes,
but not a person who can have standing to sue. Id. at 30. At the trial, the plaintiff's
attorney argued that the child should have a cause of action for the deprivation of the
familial right not to have one's father killed by the police. Id. The defense attorney argued
that when the man was killed, there was no "father" because there was no individual to
whom he could be father. Id. A judge asked, "Why wouldn't coming into the world with a
dead father be an injury?" The judge then asked, "You're not disputing the fetus is a person
now, are you?" Id. The court in Crumpton held that the child could recover due to the
deprivation of familial rights. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1422-24 (9th Cir. 1991).
Cf. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918). In Towne, the plaintiff tried to recover money
collected by the government for income tax. Id. at 424. Justice Holmes commented about
the power of words, which could also be applied to the word "person" in the fetal rights
context: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used." Id. at 425.
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2. Discrimination Against a Fetus
In Douglas v. Town of Hartford16 and in Crumpton v.
Gates,169 the courts found civil rights violations under section
1983 of chapter 42 of the United States Code due to actions against
a fetus.'70  The Crumpton court carefully noted that while the
action occurred when the plaintiff was a fetus, the harm did not
occur until birth.17 ' According to section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress was given the power to enact section 1983
in order to enforce the Amendment. 172 However, section 1983
does not provide any substantive rights and has no protections
because it is only a remedy. 1 3  Plaintiffs need an "independent
substantive basis for relief.'1 74 Since it was an attempt to enforce
the provisions of the amendment, the Act should have the same
meaning as the Fourteenth Amendment. 17  It logically follows
then, that since a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 176 a fetus should not have any rights
under section 1983.177
The Crumpton court indicated that the time of injury was
important. 178  Why should recovery for civil rights violations be
determined simply by the point at which the injury occurred?
The Crumpton court attempted to draw a clear distinction
between physical injuries and the loss of a father. 179  The court
stated that John Crumpton IV was not harmed by the loss of his
168. 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982).
169. 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
170. For a discussion of the facts of the cases, see supra text accompanying notes 79-90.
171. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1991).
172. Id. at 1420. See also N.B.T., Note, Douglas v. Town of Hartford: The Fetus as
Plaintiff Under Section 1983, 35 ALA. L. REV. 397, 399 (1984). The Act was originally
entitled, "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." Id.
173. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 601, 617 (1979); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983(AX1) (1988). Section 1983 authorizes redress for violations of constitutional and
statutory rights, but it is not itself a source of substantive rights. Id. It is a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States
Constitution and federal statutes that it describes. Id. Senator Edmunds also clarified the
authorization of § 1983 on the floor of the Senate. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568
(1871). All civil suits which § 1983 authorizes are based on the plaintiff's right as a citizen,
because the act only gives remedies. Id.
174. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420.
175. Note, supra note 172, at 399.
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
177. Note, supra note 172, at 398. "[T]he Roe holding realistically presents a severe
impediment of granting a fetus a constitutionally-basedsection 1983 action[.]" Id. at 405.
"Unless the federal courts are willing to overturn the Roe doctrine completely,
philosophical purity thus requires that a fetus not be considered a 'person' under section
1983." Id.
178. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1991).
179. Id.
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father until his birth.'8 0 Considering the possible emotional, physi-
cal, and financial impact on his mother from the death of his
father, it is easy to imagine that John may have been harmed at
the time of his father's death. Further, the Crumpton court stated
that any physical injuries to a fetus from beating a pregnant
woman harm the fetus at the time of the beating.' While this is
certainly true, it does not negate the fact that the injuries may not
disappear at that child's birth. Both the child who was physically
harmed and the fatherless child will be harmed at birth, so why
should only one recover?
While the Crumpton court attempted to distinguish prece-
dents by drawing a fine line around the point of injury, 18 2 the
Douglas court ignored all precedent and logic and instead based
its opinion on the trend in state courts toward greater legal rights
for the unborn. 183 While this may be noble, it does not appear to
be constitutional.18 4 Roe v. Wade is one of the seemingly clear
Supreme Court precedents concerning a fetus' rights, and yet
Douglas and Crumpton conflict with this precedent. The distinc-
tions are not strong enough in these recent cases to set them apart
from the Roe holding.
3. Discrimination Against Women
Some authors claim that fetal rights laws discriminate against
women.18 5 If the real purposes of forcing surgeries (allowing
recovery in tort and property and making child protection and
criminal statutes applicable to fetuses) is to protect the children,
then the logical and nondiscriminatory way to proceed would be
to regulate harmful conduct based on the proximity to future life.
Pregnancy is a foreseeable event, 8 6 and is necessary for the sur-




183. See Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (D. Conn. 1982).
184. See Note, supra note 172, at 398-99 (discussing the conflict with United States
Supreme Court decision).
185. Johnsen, supra note 4. Fetal rights laws threaten a pregnant woman's autonomy.
Id. at 620. Those laws only harm women because only women are able to bear children. Id.
But see Parness & Pritchard, supra note 133. Due to the privacy interests of a mother
(while pregnant), fathers are more readily exposed to liability for fetal injuries than are
mothers, even though the injuries are identical. Id. at 297.
186. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1258 (Ill. 1977). In this case, a
13-year-old girl was given an improper blood transfusion that later caused problems for her
child. Id. at 1251. The court stated that since it was foreseeable that this girl would later
become pregnant, her infant could recover for the negligence or willful misconduct, even
though the act occurred years prior to the infant's conception. Id. at 1258-59.
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responsible for the harm to future life.' 87 Therefore, viability and
gender should both be irrelevant.
There are many ways to cause harm to a child based on its
prenatal life. The danger may be caused by factors prior to con-
ception, such as genetic disorders,"8 8 diseases, 189 improper medi-
cal treatments,190 and a high risk of tubal pregnancy.' 9' During
pregnancy, the health of the fetus may be endangered by substan-
dard nutrition of the mother, 192 taking over-the-counter or street
drugs,193 smoking by the mother or anyone with whom the
mother comes into contact, 194 drinking alcoholic beverages, 95
and exercising or having sexual intercourse late in pregnancy. 196
The right to reproduce has been protected by the Supreme
187. See Carol A. Simon, Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 47, 90 (1978).
Given medical science's growing awareness of the numerous ways in which the
parents may permanently impair the child's physical and mental well-being, the
inconsistent and illogical exoneration of the parents becomes increasingly
egregious and unjust. The act is culpable, whether committed by a stranger or
by a parent. It is the act which is tortious and the identity of the actor should be
of no legal significance.
Holding that parent to the reasonably prudent expecting parent standard
will ensure liability for behavior that unreasonably endangers the fetus. At the
same time, such a standard, by balancing the interests of the parents and the
unborn child, will prevent liability for conduct in which the reasonable parent
would participate.
Id.
188. Shaw, supra note 34, at 75-76. There are more than 3,000 cataloged genetic
diseases. Id.
189. Id. at 67-69. Examples of diseases dangerous to the fetus are insulin-dependent
diabetes, thyroid disease, ovarian tumors, rubella, and AIDS. Id.
190. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (I11. 1977). In this
case, a 13-year-old girl was given an improper blood transfusion that later caused a problem
for her child. Id.
191. Gallagher, supra note 162, at 44.
192. Note, supra note 187, at 73.
193. Id.; Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 869-70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (son and
father sued mother and doctor for taking/prescribing drugs which discolored son's teeth);
Carol S. Larson, Overview of State Legislative and Judicial Responses, THE FUTRE OF
CHILDREN 72-84 (1991). A woman was arrested under the state criminal child support
statute for " 'failing to follow her doctor's advice' to stay off her feet, refrain from sexual
intercourse, refrain from taking street drugs, and to seek medical attention if she
experience difficulties with the pregnancy." Id. at 74. The case was dismissed, because the
court determined that the legislature did not intend the statute to be used to regulate the
conduct of a pregnant woman. Id. See also Widespread Use of Drugs by Pregnant Women
Is Found, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at Al. Surveys of selected hospitals found wide
differences in drug use by pregnant women in different areas of the country. Id. Of urine
tests of pregnant women during labor in a Sacramento hospital, 25% showed evidence of
amphetamine, cocaine, or heroin use. Id.
194. Simon, supra note 187, at 74.
195. Shaw, supra note 34, at 73. A fetus exposed to levels of alcohol throughout
pregnancy may develop Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, resulting in mental growth retardation,
facial anomalies, and other congenital defects. Id.
196. Simon, supra note 187, at 75.
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Court, 197 but like all other rights, it is not absolute.'9 8 Some peo-
ple believe the legal duty not to conceive can extend to relation-
ships that are not incestuous or age-related.' 99
Another possible harm to a fetus comes from workplace expo-
sures, such as the lead used in battery plants as described in Inter-
national Union v. Johnson Controls.2 0 0 The Supreme Court
decided that it was discriminatory to forbid women of child-bear-
ing age from working in the plant.2 0 ' The majority opinion
implied that if the company had been subjected to tort liability
that threatened the survival of the business, the answer may have
been different.20 2 The Court also noted that the odds of future
liability on the employer's part were remote.20 3 It is appalling
that the Supreme Court would even suggest that tort liability may
justify discrimination against pregnant women but physical harm
to their children does not. Waiting for tort liability may assure the
Court of a real injury, but that point will be too late for the injured
plaintiff.
197. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). "Oklahoma deprives certain
individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have
offspring," and that is unconstitutional. Id. at 536.
198. See infra note 199 for a discussion of exceptions to the right to reproduce.
199. Shaw, supra note 34, at 93. There is a legal duty not to conceive children out of
certain incestuous and consanguineous relationships. Id. Retarded adults have been legally
sterilized as long as they have first been afforded due process. Id. When genetic counseling
or carrier testing has revealed there is a likelihood of passing on deleterious genes, use of
contraceptives should be required. Id. If a couple conceives in spite of this, the child
should have a tort action at the moment of conception. Id.
200. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991); Marja-Lusa Lindbohn et al., Effects of Paternal
Occupational Exposure on Spontaneous Abortions, 81 Am. J. Pub. Health 1029 (1991). The
exposure to certain work-related substances by males may cause an increased number of
miscarriages by their wives. Id.
201. International Union v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209-10 (1991). The
Court stated that Congress has decided that a woman should be left to decide whether her
reproductive or economic role is more important. Id. at 1210.
The Court avoided far too many issues in its decision. It could have demanded studies
to determine the exact risks to fetuses from mothers and fathers and to determine how
harmful lead is for both parents prior to and during pregnancy. A decision of this type
should balance the proximity of harm to the child with the rights of all involved. Was there
a less restrictive means to handle the harmful environment? The Court of Appeals
determined that this issue was waived because it was not adequately presented.
International Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1989). Requiring a
person to decide between a job and a family is not a realistic solution. Whether or not to
continue working is not always a real choice. Economic factors often necessitate that both
parents work, so the real choice becomes whether or not to risk having children. Perhaps
the potential parents could have been transferred to another job for equal pay. Perhaps the
business should have been required to find a less harmful way to run the plant.
202. International Union, 111 S. Ct. at 1209. The incremental cost of hiring women
due to possible damages would not justify discrimination against them, but the Court
clarified that this is not a case in which costs threaten the survival of the business. Id.
203. Id. at 1199. "If, under general tort principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-
protection policies, the employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has
not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at best." Id.
Justice White's concurring opinion was far more persuasive. 20 4
He claimed that although this policy did not satisfy Title VII, that
did not mean that the company had to invalidate its entire pol-
icy.20 5 The Justice pointed out that the possibility of tort liability is
not quite so remote, considering that warning the parents of the
danger will not prevent the injured child, as an innocent third
party, from suing the company. 0 6 Complying with federal laws
(such as Title VII) does not necessarily preempt state tort liability
(as the majority suggested).20 Also, although tort liability requires
negligence, it is difficult to determine today what will be consid-
ered negligent when the injured chooses to sue.20 8 Justice White
felt that protecting an unborn child was as legitimate a state inter-
est as protecting other third parties. 20 9  He also claimed that
neither precedent nor Title VII required the Court to exclude
women (from a harmful work environment) who were already
pregnant. °
4. Summary
Abortion will be a controversial subject for generations- per-
haps forever. There is some inherent conflict in discussing both
fetal rights and abortion, but advocates on both sides of the issue
should be able to admit that it is in our best interests to have
healthy children. In order to accomplish this, some protection for
unborn children is needed. People (not just women) will have to
give up some of their rights, but that does not signal the end of all
freedoms, or the end of abortion, or even the end of working in
battery plants. It simply means that some rights will have to be
curtailed in order to best meet the goals of our society.
Other than the feared impact on abortion, there is no logical
reason to deny a fetus a remedy under section 1983. Courts
204. Id. at 1210 (White, J., concurring).
205. International Union, 111 S. Ct. at 1215 (White, J., concurring). Today, Johnson
Controls allows women to work in jobs that were previously banned, and it no longer has
any fetal protection policy. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., BNA's Corporate Couns. Wkly.,
Feb. 5, 1992, at 8. The union is now pushing the company to clean up the job sites and to
settle the claims.
206. Id. at 1210-11.
207. Id. at 1211. See also English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990) (action
under state law for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by the
Energy Reorganization Act); California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Gurerra, 479 U.S. 272,
292 (1987) (state statute requiring the provision of leave to employees disabled by
pregnancy not preempted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
208. International Union, 111 S. Ct. at 1211 (White, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 1213. "On the facts of this case, for example, protecting fetal safety while
carrying out the duties of battery manufacturing is as much a legitimate concern as is safety
to third parties in guarding prisons (Dothard) or flying airplanes (Criswell)." Id.
210. Id. at 1214.
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should not have to attempt to clarify the exact point at which a
fetus/person is injured, as Judge Boochever did in Crumpton, 1
in order to achieve a just result. Crumpton is a good example of
how we could achieve better results by focusing more on the
needs of future generations.
D. CRIMINAL LAW
Homicide generally requires a victim who was human and
alive. 12 At early common law, a fetus could be "murdered"
thirty-eight days to eighty days after conception; however, that
child had to be first born alive and then die from the injuries in
order to be considered a homicide victim. 213 Though the born-
alive rule is less common today, it does still exist in a majority of
jurisdictions214 and severely limits the number of chargeable
homicides of the unborn.
It is difficult to dispute that a fetus meets the requirements of
being both alive and human (at least at some point in the nine
month gestation). Therefore, a fetus should be "worthy" of being
murdered. Many will argue that a fetus is not the equivalent of a
born human being, but even so, that does not render the inten-
tional killing of an unborn child any less revolting or any less
deserving of punishment. Some may worry about the implications
to abortion, but legislators should be well aware of how to draft
statutes with exceptions.
Perhaps some legislatures feel that feticide requires a differ-
ent state of culpability; if so, this should be defined within the stat-
utes. Illegal abortion 215 and manslaughter2 16 are inferior charges
for such crimes. "Illegal abortion" sounds as though the procedure
was consented-to but technically flawed. Manslaughter is gener-
ally "of a less cruel and aggravated character than [murder] and
deserving of less punishment. '217 Neither correctly describes the
211. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
212. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(c) (2d ed.
1986).
213. Id.
214. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985). The overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions within the United States that have considered the issue held that a criminally
caused death of a fetus is not homicide unless the fetus was born alive. Id. at 628-29.
215. See Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983). The estranged husband
of a pregnant woman forced his hand into wife's vagina, intending to destroy the child. Id.
at 61-62. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the man could be charged with illegal
abortion, but not with homicide. Id. at 65.
216. See State v. Willis, 457 So. 2d 959 (Miss. 1984). Killing an unborn child is
manslaughter, but killing the mother is murder. Id. at 960.
217. State v. Hutter, 18 N.W.2d 203, 206-07 (Neb. 1945).
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premeditated destruction of a fetus against the wishes of the
mother.
E. PROPERTY LAW
In attempts to assure the future wealth of a child, property
law has long advanced the rights of fetuses. Perhaps this area of
law has been a front-runner in protecting the interests of future
children because fetuses and embryos have been given some
rights in their present states.2 18  In one case, a child who was born
after the testator's death not only was able to receive a trust inher-
itance from his father, but also received income from the trust
from the date of his father's death prior to his birth.219
The state of Louisiana treats an in vitro fertilized human
ovum as a juridical person, entitling it to sue and be sued.220 The
statutes require that such an embryo be given an identity by the
medical facility, and upon motion, a court will appoint a curator to
protect the embryo's rights. 22 1 This juridical person cannot be
intentionally destroyed by any person.222 These rights given to an
embryo are all examples of the expansion of the rights of the
unborn, not only pre-viability, but pre-implantation into a human
being.
Still, some argue that when considering the state's legitimate
interest of promoting the unborn's potential for life, treating the
fetus' property interests as contingent on birth could actually
undermine an interest in potential life. They predict that there
might be an incentive to abort a fetus to avoid sharing an inheri-
tance or trust with posthumously born issue. 2 3 This is interesting
to ponder, but hopefully too remote to be a real threat.
F. CHILD PROTECTION
Child neglect and criminal laws often were not written to
218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (West 1991). "A 'human embryo' for the purposes of
this Chapter is an in vitro fertilized human ovum, with certain rights granted by law,
composed of one or more living human cells and human genetic material so unified and
organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child." Id. See infra notes 119-22
(discussing a few examples of rights held in the embryo's present state).
219. Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 220 A. 467 (R.I. 1938).
220. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124 (West 1991). "As a juridical person, the in vitro
fertilized human ovum shall be given an identification by the medical facility . .. which
entitles such ovum to sue or be sued. The confidentiality of the in vitro fertilization patient
shall be maintained." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at § 9:129. "A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which
shall not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or through the
actions of any other such person." Id.
223. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 133, at 265=67.
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include passing drugs to fetuses, 224 yet many courts are using evi-
dence of drug use while pregnant to pursue criminal charges225 as
well as charges of neglect.226 Since treatment of one child can be
used as evidence toward neglect allegations involving a second
221 '~ rachild, prenatal treatment has been used as probative evidence
of neglect of the future child.228 One judge argued that petition-
ers were not seeking a charge for neglect of the fetus but, instead,
for the child born with positive toxicology result 22 -- even though
all the acts by the mother which caused the charge occurred when
the child was a fetus. 3 °
224. State v. Gray, 1990 WL 125695 (Ohio App.) (Appendix A-from Court of
Common Pleas). Neglect is characterized by acts of omission, but ingestion of drugs is an
act of commission. Id. at 5. A woman who was twelve weeks pregnant was charged by a
county court in North Dakota with reckless endangerment of her fetus for inhaling paint
vapors. DeAnne Hilgers, Cass Fetal Safety Case a 'First', FARGO FORUM, Feb. 11, 1992, at
Al, A12. The North Dakota "reckless endangerment" statute describes the crime as
follows: "A person is guilty of an offense if he creates a substantial risk of serious bodily
injury or death to another." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-03 (1985). The Assistant Cass
Country State's Attorney, Stepher. Dawson, said he thinks "the statute anticipates
protecting unborn children" even though the legislature did not specifically include the
unborn within the statute. DeAnne Hilgers, Fargo Attorney Wants Greywind Case
Reconsidered, FARGO FORUM, Feb. 11, 1992, at A6.
225. Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). A woman violated a
statute regarding delivery of a controlled substance by delivering drugs to her child
through the umbilical cord. Id. at 419-20. See supra note 224 (discussing a North Dakota
county example).
226. E.g., In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Div. 1990). Mothers were
charged with neglect when their children were born with a positive toxicology for cocaine.
Id. at 281. The judge determined that the children were neglected because "a positive
toxicology for cocaine in a newborn constitutes 'actual impairment."' Id. at 283.
227. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Gray, 1990 WL
125695 (Ohio App.) (Appendix A-from Court of Common Pleas) ("The absurdity of this
argument is clear, for how can one owe a duty of care, protection or support to the child to
be born without owing the same duty to the fetus."); In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d
280, 283 (App. Div. 1990). The judge determined that a single act of misconduct can
support a finding of neglect, and that act may occur prior to a child's birth. Id.
228. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
229. Id. The judge determined that it was proper to consider the newborn's
withdrawal symptoms in neglect proceedings. Id. at 741.
230. In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d at 285. The North Dakota case, supra note
224, involved similar logic. The defendant had been convicted eleven times in eleven
months for inhaling volatile chemicals. DeAnne Hilgers, Fargo Attorney Wants Greywind
Case Reconsidered, FARGO FORUM, Feb. 11, 1992, at A6. Assistant Cass County State's
Attorney Stephen Dawson said he based this charge of reckless endangerment on her
criminal history and an investigation of her-not as protection for the fetus. Id. The
defendant was sentenced to nine months at the North Dakota State Farm. DeAnne
Hilgers, Cass Fetal Safety Case a 'First', FARGO FORUM, Feb. 11, 1992, at Al, A12.
Defendant Greywind, who pleaded guilty after refusing an attorney, was later allowed to
withdraw her plea. Marilynn Wheeler, Fargo Woman Becomes Pregnant Cause, GRAND
FORKS HERALD, Feb. 13, 1992, at LA. Hours after she was released on bail, she was arrested
again-this time for illegal inhalation of chemical vapors. Stephen J. Lee, Fargo Paint
Sniffer Caught Again, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Feb. 14, 1992, at IA, 9A.
If this case continues to trial, it may prove to be an interesting test of North Dakota's
fetal protection policies. Greywind expressed her desire to abort the fetus, and Judge
Georgia Dawson authorized the sheriff's department to transport her to any medical
appointments. Id. Attorney Dawson has said that even if Greywind aborts the fetus, he will
prosecute her for reckless endangerment of the fetus prior to the abortion. Id. If the fetus
is aborted, the trial will concern a charge to protect a fetus which no longer exists, based on
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Some courts also have difficulty accepting that a child has a
right to be born with a sound mind and body.23 ' It is especially
difficult to accept such a right, considering that this requirement
would necessitate a holding that all pre-born individuals have a
right to medical treatment while many born individuals do not. 32
In this area, it appears that the fetus has been granted greater
rights than other persons.
In order to get a protection order for a fetus, one judge
attempted to draw links to homicide233 and property law234 and
yet deny the reasoning of tort law.235 Apparently he felt that the
distinctions and similarities were obvious, because the judge failed
to cite logical reasons why these actions were more like homicide
and property than they were like tort law.236
The criminal and neglect charges for passing drugs to fetuses
are wrought with the same difficulties as many other fetal areas.
The decisions are saturated with confusing arguments, simply
because judges and prosecutors lack precedents and statutes to
allow them to protect fetuses. As with other areas, the
rights/desires of a fetus to be born healthy conflict with the
mother's desire to consume illegal drugs. Given the importance of
the fetal interest and the illegality of the maternal desire, prosecu-
tors and social workers should not have to wait until a child is born
with drug problems before appropriate steps can be taken.
a statute which may never have been intended to protect the unborn, by a State's Attorney
who claims the charge was not to protect the fetus.231. Nelson, supra note 29, at 736 (no cases holding that living persons, much less
fetuses, have the right to be healthy); Becker v. Schwartz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). A child
cannot expect life without deformities. Id. at 900. This child was born with Down's
syndrome and then sued for wrongful life because her mother was not informed of
increased risk for older mothers. Id. at 897. The court held that there is no precedent to
hold that a child has a fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human being. Id.
at 900.
232. Nelson, supra note 29, at 736.
233. In re Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Fam. Ct. 1984). The legislature
defined homicide as including unborn children over 24 weeks. Id. at 994. The court
reasoned that this legislature would not intend to preclude the issuance of an order of
protection against a third party to prevent actions that could result in injury or death of a
fetus. Id. at 995.
234. Id. "Although the child's property interest is not realized until birth, it is
recognized while the child is yet a fetus." Id.
235. Id. at 998. Since injury is not prerequisite to a protection order, tort rationale
supporting birth as prerequisite is not applicable. Id. at 997-98.
236. Id. at 991-98. The link to homicide was poor because the legislature specifically
limited the right to unborn children over 24 weeks-this fetus was younger. The judge
failed to reason why property law was relevant and did not discuss the fact that property
law basically protects the child. Tort law was excluded, simply due to the injury
requirement.
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G. RAMIFICATIONS
Different jurisdictions and areas of the law treat fetuses in
unique ways. This is nothing new to our legal system, but the
ramifications of these discrepancies have become problematic. In
some cases there may be too many contrasting precedents for the
triers of fact.237 In others, advances in medicine have left jurisdic-
tions without any precedents, and the judges search desperately
for decisions on which to hang their hats.238 There are also cases
in which judges feel compelled by moral convictions (or a desire
for justice), causing them to make decisions that are not logical.239
The greatest cause of the problem has been the overemphasis
on abortion. Certainly fetal rights and abortion are related issues,
but our society cannot afford to ignore fetal rights issues just to
avoid dealing with the abortion controversy. Fears, ignorance,
and other problems have led us into the current state of confusion.
Without serious consideration and a multitude of changes, fetal
rights laws will continue to be formed by haphazard decisions.
Advances in science and medicine and changes in our social and
moral structure will render the situation even more complex.
Confusing and inconsistent laws are not just mere inconveniences:
they can create injustice and cause entire generations to be unpro-
tected from countless threats at the most vulnerable point in their
lives.
III. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that a child's health and welfare is affected by
many circumstances that occur prior to birth.24 ° Protection of our
237. Id. See supra note 236 (discussing some of the precedents this judge considered).
238. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (clarifying that in many situations that
hook has been Roe v. Wade); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's
Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HAWv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986). "Thus the Roe viability 'line'
becomes not only a limit on the woman's freedom to choose abortion, but also an affirmative
grant of legal rights and entitlements to the fetus, conferring more than the very
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment personhood status the Supreme Court explicitly found
inapplicable." Id. at 42.
239. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra text accompanying
notes 178 to 184 (discussing the problems with the Crumpton holding). See also Wallace v.
Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 138 (N.H. 1980) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
No one ever asserted that adults were not 'persons' because they had to survive
the injury to sue. The illogic of the rule led to the passage of 'wrongful death' or
'survivor' acts .... The majority asserts that a cause of action for an aborted
child 'benefits only the parents.' That principle also is valid if applied to the
death of a fourteen-year-old child or an elderly person with no living relatives.
Id. at 138.
240. See supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text (discussing some of these harms).
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children is a worthwhile goal, and it needs to be addressed in a
deliberate, consistent fashion.
A Model Fetal Rights Act could be drafted by a host of special-
ists from all the applicable areas of law. These experts could for-
mulate a logical, consistent act with the intention of protecting our
children. It is not necessary that every state adopt this act or that
the results be identical, but it would at least encourage legislatures
to examine their own laws and redraft poorly written sections.
Abortion will most likely be controversial for some time to
come, but that does not need to hinder the greater goal of protect-
ing life-at whatever stage the state deems it to begin. One possi-
ble approach is to consider each area of law and ask certain
questions: (1) Will this injury harm the child/fetus/embryo? and
(2) Is there a balancing of rights necessary? Some examples of this
system follow:
1. Area: Tort law recovery when the fetus was prenatally
injured and the child was born alive. Question 1: Yes, the child is
harmed. Question 2: No. Balancing of rights is not necessary,
because a tortfeasor's rights are not violated by demanding recov-
ery for a prenatal injury, so long as the other tort requirements are
met. Solution: Recovery should be allowed for injuries at any
stage of development or even preconception.
2. Area: Abortion. Question 1: Yes, the unborn are harmed.
Question 2: Yes, there is a balancing of rights required between
the mother's privacy or other rights and the rights of the fetus.
Solution: Let each state balance these rights according to its own
values. The state could determine that abortion is never allowed,
allowed until some stage, or allowed for some reasons.
3. Area: Activities harmful to the fetus, but not illegal (such
as smoking and harmful jobs). Question 1: Fetus is harmed, by
definition. Question 2: The rights of many are involved and must
be balanced. Solution: States should handle this much like the
abortion question-deal with each harmful situation (or group of
situations) and balance according to the proximity of harm to the
fetus and the intrusiveness to others involved. The state could
determine that an activity such as smoking is always allowed,
allowed until some stage, allowed at some level, or allowed for
some reasons.
4. Area: Illegal drug use. Question 1: Yes, the fetus is
harmed. Question 2: This activity is illegal by definition, so no bal-
ancing of rights is necessary. Solution: Arrest violators for com-
mitting these illegal acts and for harming the child.
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These solutions are not perfect, but they are logical and con-
sistent. Just raising the questions would send legislatures in the
right direction. Eventually Roe v. Wade could cease to be the cor-
nerstone for so many fetal rights decisions. Courts could rely on
statutes that were drafted with a holistic perspective, balancing
the rights of all those affected. In any case, something does need
to be done. Changes are necessary not just for the lawyers and
judges, but for the future of our children.
Beth Driscoll Osowski
